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Abstract: Huw Price has argued that naturalistic philosophy inevitably leads to a
deflationary approach to ontological questions. In this paper, I rebut these
arguments. A more substantive, less language-focused approach to metaphysics
remains open to naturalists. However, rebutting one of Price’s main arguments
requires rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. So, even though
Price’s argument is unsound, it reveals that naturalists cannot rest content with
broadly Quinean, “mainstream metaphysics,” which, I suggest, naturalists also
have independent reasons to reject.
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According to a standard potted history of twentieth-century philosophy, W.V.O.
Quine made the world safe for metaphysical inquiry again, in part by offering a
definitive refutation of Rudolf Carnap’s deflationary view of metaphysics. Quine
is thus commonly taken to have provided much of the framework for “main-
stream” analytic metaphysics (Manley 2009, 3–4; van Inwagen 1998, 2009). This
approach to metaphysics takes ontological disputes to be substantive debates
about the nature of the world, rather than merely verbal, conceptual, or prag-
matic disputes. According to Quine, metaphysical debates are to be adjudicated
using the same methods used to settle debates within science: namely, by
evaluating competing theories with respect to global theoretical virtues, such
as simplicity, explanatory power, and integration with other theories (see, e.g.
Sider 2011, esp. 166ff.). It is this continuity between natural science and meta-
physics that is the primary reason that Quinean metaphysics is regarded as
naturalistic.1
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1 Cf. Quine’s famous claim that “Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with
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Quine’s approach to metaphysics is often taken to motivate the idea that the
ontology we should accept is the one that turns out to be required by science.
Following Huw Price, we can call this (the ontological version of) object naturalism
– that “all there is is the world studied by science” (2004, 185, italics in original).
Of course, it is not obvious how, if at all, purported entities in a variety of domains
– especially what Price calls “M-worlds”: morality, meaning, mathematics, and
mentality – fit into the “world studied by science” (Price 1997). Thus, object
naturalism motivates “placement problems” with respect to these domains.2
In a series of papers, Huw Price has argued that a proper understanding of
naturalism inevitably leads to a more deflationary approach to placement pro-
blems and to ontological questions in general.3 According to his “ontological
quietism,” or what I’ll call “ontological deflationism,” there is no “separate
second-order science of ontology,” and the ontologist rests content with “the
mundane business of existential quantification carried out by first-order specia-
lists in the course of their working lives” (1992, 50).4
One of Price’s two main routes from naturalism to ontological deflationism
begins with the claim that naturalists should focus on how we humans talk about
apparently non-naturalistic domains, instead of the purported referents of this
talk.5 Price claims that this focus raises serious problems with what he calls
“Representationalism” – the idea that language mirrors the world via substantive
semantic relations (2004, 189; 2011a, 5–6, 10–11). By abandoning
Representationalism, we can see that superficially descriptive language serves a
wide variety of functions. (This is Price’s “functional pluralism,” to which I return
below (cf. Price 1997, 136).) Describing the functions of discourse about the
different M-worlds, and how these functions differ from those of scientific
2 See Jackson (1998) for an influential statement of the idea that one of the main tasks of
“serious metaphysics” is to solve placement problems and an equally influential account of
how to go about solving them, which has come to be called the “Canberra Plan.”
3 Many of these papers are collected in Price’s (2011b). Jenann Ismael (2013, 86) has recently
dubbed Price’s approach the “Sydney Plan” in order to contrast it with “the most influential
self-proclaimed naturalistic approach” to metaphysics – the Canberra Plan – which endorses
object naturalism.
4 As Thomasson (2013, 111–12) notes, care must be taken in interpreting “deflationary.” She
claims that this kind of deflationism deflates the ontological debates about entities, not the
entities themselves. Hence, proponents might prefer the label “meta-ontological deflationism,”
reserving the term “simple realism” or “minimal realism” for their first-order ontological view.
(See also Price (1992, 49–52).)
5 I adopt Price’s geographical metaphor of “routes” or “paths” to ontological deflationism – a
“location on the contemporary philosophical map” that Price claims is both “easily accessible
from familiar and popular places” but also “almost invisible, almost unvisited,” in part because
of the intuitive appeal of Representationalism (2011a, 11).
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discourse, is all that it is needed to solve (or, better, dissolve) placement problems.
In particular, there is allegedly no further factual question about whether moral,
mental, meaning, or mathematical properties “really” exist. And there is no need
to find truthmakers for discourse about such apparently non-naturalistic domains
– no need to pursue metaphysics on a “matching game” model (Price 2011a, 3–6).
Thus, Price’s deflationary approach allegedly offers a naturalistic explanation of
“how topics such as morality and meaning might remain high and dry, untouched
and unthreatened by the rise of the scientific tide” without having to locate
morality or intentionality in the natural world (Price 1997, 133).
In the first section following this introduction, “Subject naturalism need not
be ‘prior to’ object naturalism”, I argue that naturalists have an escape route
from this path to ontological deflationism; they can adopt a non-linguistic,
“material,” approach to metaphysical inquiry, against which, I argue, Price
provides no convincing argument. In the first sub-section, “The material con-
ception as a default assumption”, I argue that the material approach is merely a
starting point for metaphysical inquiry, and thus, contra Price, does not unjus-
tifiably ignore competing non-cognitivist approaches. Further, as I argue in the
second sub-section, “The role of semantic notions in metaphysics”, there are
questions about at least some M-worlds that remain unaddressed by his exclu-
sively linguistic approach but which the material approach handles adeptly.6 So,
pace Price, the linguistic approach does not have the upper hand even in the
absence of a general argument for object naturalism.
In the second main section, “Quine and Carnap on ontology”, I discuss how
Price can turn to his second path from naturalism to ontological deflationism to
attempt to block this escape route. This second path focuses on the debate
between Carnap and Quine over metaphysical methodology. Quine’s criterion
of ontological commitment does call for a linguistic approach to ontological
debates. So, if we accept this criterion, moving from claims about language to
object naturalist claims about the world is embroiled with the substantive
semantic notions invoked by, and the problems facing, Representationalism.
Price focuses, though, on an additional challenge facing non-deflationary
Quinean metaphysics. He claims that it is not acceptable by Quine’s own
naturalistic lights, for it would make substantive metaphysics a “second-order”
inquiry outside of science. Thus, Price argues that Quine’s naturalism in fact
motivates a “pale,” deflationary metaphysics of the kind that Carnap favored
(Price 2007, 2009).
6 Of the M-worlds, mentality seems to pose the most difficulty for Price’s deflationary approach
in this regard. See the sub-section, “The role of semantic notions in metaphysical inquiry”, and
notes 9 and 11.
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As I discuss in the first sub-section, “Blocking the move from minimal
deflationism to ontological deflationism”, naturalists can avoid the second
route to ontological deflationism if they abandon Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment. Fortunately, as I point out in the second sub-section, “Naturalistic
reasons to reject Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment”, they have inde-
pendent, naturalistically motivated reasons for doing so. Both of these points
suggest that Quine’s reformation of metaphysics was inadequate by the stan-
dards set by his own naturalistic program.
In the third and final main section, “A sketch of non-deflationary naturalis-
tic metaphysics”, I outline an alternative, non-deflationary naturalistic approach
to ontology. Importantly, abandoning Quine’s criterion of ontological commit-
ment allows us to offer oblique answers to some ontological questions, captur-
ing the grain of truth in skeptical attitudes toward (some of) metaphysics
without requiring full-blown ontological deflationism.
Subject naturalism need not be “prior to” object
naturalism
Price contrasts Quinean “object naturalism,” as introduced above, with his pre-
ferred version, “subject naturalism,” which follows Hume and Nietzsche in think-
ing that “philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about ourselves”
(2004, 186, italics in original). Subject naturalism is “the philosophical viewpoint
that begins with the realization that we humans (our thought and talk included)
are surely part of the natural world” (2011a, 5). Thus, “[subject naturalism] adopts
the scientific perspective of a linguistic anthropologist, studying human language
as a phenomenon in the natural world” (2011a, 11; 2011b, xi).
Given this characterization, one might think that subject naturalism does
not really compete with object naturalism. As Price points out, object naturalists
will insist that they are subject naturalists too. For, from their perspective,
subject naturalism is merely a corollary of object naturalism (2004, 186).
“After all, if all real entities are natural entities, we humans are surely natural
entities” (2004, 186).
Price argues that this is mistaken. In a nutshell, he claims that object
naturalism presupposes an account of the relation between language and the
world (Representationalism) that is part of the purview of subject naturalism.
This is what he calls the priority thesis – that “subject naturalism is theoretically
prior to object naturalism because the latter depends on validation from a
subject naturalist perspective” (2004, 186). Further, he thinks that there are
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good reasons to doubt whether Representationalism will be validated from a
subject naturalist point of view. This is what he calls the invalidity thesis. In his
view, there is reason to think that subject naturalism will reveal that the object
naturalist approach is untenable (2004, 187).
I shall argue that Price does not provide a convincing argument for the
priority thesis, which renders his worries about Representationalism otiose.
Object naturalism need not presuppose Representationalism, so it is not under-
mined if Representationalism turns out to be false.7
To see how object naturalists can avoid Price’s attack we need to introduce
his distinction between two conceptions of how to approach placement pro-
blems: the material conception and the linguistic conception. On the material
conception, we are confronted with some alleged phenomenon or entity – such
as intentionality, consciousness, or moral goodness – and in light of a commit-
ment to object naturalism, come to wonder how this phenomenon or entity
could fit into the natural world. On the contrasting, linguistic conception,
the starting point lies in human linguistic practices, broadly construed. Roughly, we note
that humans (ourselves or others) employ the term “X” in language, or the concept X, in
thought. In the light of commitment to object naturalism, again, we come to wonder how
what these speakers are thereby talking or thinking about could be the kind of thing
studied by science. (Price 2004, 188)
Given the linguistic conception, object naturalists must find a way to move from
the term “X” (or concept X) to its supposed object, X – to move from claims
about language (or thought) to claims about the world. That is, they must invoke
Representationalism. Thus, according to Price, object naturalism “rests on sub-
stantial theoretical assumptions about what we humans do with language –
roughly, the assumption that substantial ‘word-world’ semantic relations are a
part of the best scientific account of our use of the relevant terms” (Price 2004,
190). But this assumption is exactly the kind of thing that subject naturalism
investigates. Thus, given a linguistic conception of the origin of placement
problems, subject naturalism is prior to object naturalism.
7 Penelope Maddy’s Second Philosopher is an example of someone who endorses semantic
deflationism (and thus would reject Representationalism) but rejects ontological deflationism.
“[W]hen the question is ontology, her focus is on what there is, not on what various people are
inclined to think or say there is” (Maddy 2007, 399). Further, she does not rest content with the
quantification of other “first-order specialists.” “Second Metaphysics is emphatically not a
purely descriptive enterprise: the Second Philosopher holds [definite views about when the
existence of atoms was established], not merely that scientists thought this or that at various
times” (2007, 403). See the sub-section, “Naturalistic reasons to reject Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment”, below.
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Price now turns to defending the invalidity thesis. He outlines three signifi-
cant worries that threaten to undermine Representationalism: (a) semantic
deflationism may be true (2004, 191–2), (b) even non-deflationary semantic
notions may be too indeterminate to do the work required by object naturalism
(2004, 192), and (c) it is unclear if the semantic notions themselves can be
investigated from the viewpoint of object naturalism (2004, 192–5).
I agree that these are serious worries for Representationalism. However, they
pose a challenge to object naturalism only if the linguistic conception of place-
ment problems is correct. As noted above, and as Price acknowledges, the above
argument for the priority thesis (on which, in turn, the invalidity thesis depends)
goes through only if the linguistic conception is true (2004, 188–9, 190). Thus, he
must argue against the material conception of placement problems. Here I think
that Price is on much shakier ground.8
The material conception as a default assumption
Price has two main arguments against the material conception. The first is that
adopting the material conception requires one to ignore, or rule out, any non-
cognitivist dissolution of placement problems (Price 2004, 188, 195). If standard
use of the term “X” did not have a referential function, then there would simply
be no material problem about the purported X. Equivalently, if the material
conception were correct, then the use of the term “X” would be referential. This
would allegedly show that non-cognitivism “is not so much wrong as completely
wrongheaded – a view which simply starts in the wrong place” (2004, 188).
Couldn’t the object naturalist simply insist that non-cognitivism is “wrong-
headed”?9 Price claims that this is a “radically anti-naturalistic move,” for it is
allegedly to “simply ignore the possibility that philosophy might have something
to learn from naturalistic – subject naturalistic – reflection on the things that
humans do with language” (2004, 196, italics in original). In other words, Price
claims that adopting the material conception would amount to claiming that
non-cognitivism should not even be acknowledged as an admissible linguistic
hypothesis. And this, Price claims, would be an anti-naturalistic attempt to rule
a priori on an issue that is the subject of ongoing scientific investigation into
human language use.
8 Price admits that he argues “somewhat tentatively” that the material conception is not a live
option for object naturalists (2004, 189). If my discussion is on the right track, his tentativeness
is warranted.
9 At least for some areas of discourse – some of Price’s “M-worlds”? Non-cognitivism is far less
attractive for discourse about the mental than, say, for moral discourse.
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I see no reason to think that the material conception is anti-naturalistic in
the way that Price suggests. The material conception is merely a starting point
for, or default assumption about, metaphysical inquiry, not a claim about where
such inquiry must end up. Those who adopt the material conception think that it
is unlikely that “naturalistic reflection on what we humans do with language”
will support non-cognitivism (at least across the board; see notes 6, 9, and 11).
And they think that non-cognitivist approaches to placement problems should
be pursued only after cognitivist (“object-oriented” or “material”) approaches
have failed. Further, they think that these methodological recommendations are
supported by the fact that discourse about the M-worlds is prima facie cognitive
(hence the “default” nature of the assumption) and by the fact that there are
well-known semantic difficulties, such as the Frege-Geach (or “embedding”)
problem, with non-cognitivist approaches. However, as good fallibilists, they
are willing to revise this assessment as new evidence comes in or if cognitivist
approaches prove unworkable.
Note also that if the material conception were anti-naturalistic in the way
Price identifies, then his own approach would be anti-naturalistic in the very
same way. For, Price’s approach views all of language with an ironic detachment
whose “default assumption” is always that the apparent ontological commit-
ments of our discourse “should not be taken at their face value” (2011a, 30). A
proponent of the material conception might claim that this ignores, or rules out,
the possibility that M-world predicates straightforwardly express objective prop-
erties – that it implies that cognitivism “is not so much wrong as completely
wrongheaded” – and is thus an a priori attempt to close off legitimate avenues
of exploration in “linguistic anthropology.” However, this complaint would
make the same mistake that Price does. The linguistic conception, like the
material conception, is merely a recommendation for how to begin a metaphy-
sical research program, not the end product of such a program. In general, such
recommendations need not be neutral with respect to every possible competing
recommendation. Of course, if one’s default assumptions are merely tacit and go
unrecognized, then there is a real danger that incompatible views will be
invisible and go unexplored. However, this is not a worry here, given that
Price has made these competing assumptions explicit.
The role of semantic notions in metaphysical inquiry
Price’s second argument against the material conception begins by noting that
semantic notions are “part of the toolkit” of (at least the most influential
approaches to) contemporary metaphysics (2004, 196). Given this, he argues
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that object naturalists face a dilemma. Either substantive semantic notions are
involved in metaphysics, in which case the challenges to Representationalism
outlined above rear their heads, or only deflationary semantic notions are
involved in metaphysics. In the latter case, Price claims that the object naturalist
no longer has the materials to offer a general argument for her position (the kind
of argument that would parallel causal-explanatory arguments for physicalism),
and thus has no advantage over her subject naturalist opponents (2004, 197). As
Price puts it, such an object naturalist is vulnerable to the subject naturalist
who takes advantage of a non-representationalist theoretical perspective to avoid the
material mode altogether. If such an opponent can explain why natural creatures in a
natural environment come to talk in these plural ways – of “truth,” “value,” “meaning,”
“causation,” and all the rest – what puzzle remains? What debt does philosophy now owe
to science? (2004, 198)
In response, I think that proponents of the material conception of placement
problems can push back against Price’s suggestion that semantic notions play
an indispensable role in metaphysics. This assumption may seem to be well-
supported if one focuses on the Canberra Plan, with its emphasis on conceptual
analysis, but this apparent support fades if one broadens one’s survey of con-
temporary metaphysical methodology to include the work of such philosophers
as Penelope Maddy (2007) and Michael Devitt (2010), each of whom do not rely
on semantic notions (whether substantive or deflationary) when they do
metaphysics.10
This response is, of course, programmatic and would require much more
argument to flesh out fully. In any case, it is likely that the second horn of
Price’s dilemma – the lack of a general argument for naturalism – will also pose
a challenge to these alternative approaches to metaphysics. This is supported by
the fact that naturalistic metaphysics becomes more of a piecemeal, case-by-
case affair on Devitt’s and Maddy’s approaches. (See, e.g. Devitt (2009, 319–20)
and Maddy (2007, 402–3).) So, proponents of the material conception will need
to blunt this second horn.
Fortunately, I think that they can do so. Price’s argument here hinges on the
claim that the object naturalist has no advantage over the subject naturalist if
she does not have a general argument for her position. I think this is mistaken.
For, contra the previous block quotation from Price, important questions about
at least some M-worlds remain even after we answer all of the subject natural-
ist’s questions about how we talk in these domains. For instance, even if we
10 See also Stich (1996, 29–82), although he is somewhat skeptical about the prospects for the
kind of naturalistic metaphysics he sketches there.
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have answered all questions about the function of our talk about the mental,
questions about minds remain that are entirely independent of (and prior to)
questions about our use of mental language.11 This is reflected in the banal
observation that non-human animals had mental states (at least perceptual and
affective states) long before language users existed, and they would have had
these mental states even if language users never existed. Questions about what
these states were like, how they were related to these animals’ neural states, and
the role these mental states played in the animals’ behavioral repertoires are all
legitimate questions that have nothing to do with how we happen to talk about
mentality. These would remain legitimate, open questions, settled by non-lin-
guistic facts about the world, even if humans did not use language. (Of course,
in that case, these questions would go unasked, at least by us.)
Now, Price might respond that all of the questions mentioned above are
scientific questions, not metaphysical questions about the mind, and, as such,
they are perfectly consistent with a deflationist attitude toward ontology. (His
discussion of two interpretations of the question about what makes it true that
snow is white suggests this response (2011a, 14).)
I believe that this response again reveals a flawed assumption about the
nature of naturalistic metaphysics and its relation to the other sciences, namely,
that if naturalistic metaphysics is be viable as a distinct discipline at all, then
it must be a relatively formal, logical cum linguistic, endeavor – a kind of
second-level project which takes data from the natural sciences as input. It is
understandable that Price makes this assumption about the views he opposes,
given that, as I discuss in the next section, it follows from Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment. However, as I also point out there, naturalists have
good reason to reject this criterion.
Quine and Carnap on ontology
As explicated by Peter van Inwagen, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment
is a “set of interrelated theses… about how one should settle philosophical
disputes about what there is” (2009, 500). Quine’s criterion says that participants
in ontological debates should regiment the claims they want to affirm into the
“quantifier-variable idiom” – first-order logic. Their ontological commitments are
11 While the nature of morality and modality may be constitutively dependent on, and
exhausted by, our linguistic and conceptual practices with respect to moral and modal terms,
I see little hope of defending the analogous claim with respect to mentality.
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then determined by the existentially quantified sentences that are logical con-
sequences of these regimented claims. If participants are unwilling to accept some
of these commitments, they must find alternate renderings of the relevant theses
they want to affirm that do not imply the offending existentially quantified
statements (cf. van Inwagen 2009, 506).12
It is fairly easy to see that Quine’s criterion requires a linguistic approach to
ontological debates. Quine begins with the truism that we, not sentences or
theories, are the primary bearers of ontological commitments (1948/1980, 8).
When he initially characterizes the problem of determining one’s ontological
commitments he often does so in terms of mental states. For instance, he
interprets the question of what is in our ontology as concerning which entities
we “assume” (Quine 1981, 2) or “believe in” (Quine 1951/1980, 44, 1981, 21).13 But
Quine’s ontological criterion transforms this from a question about our psycho-
logical attitudes toward (purported) entities into a question about which exis-
tentially quantified sentences follow from our best theories. So, “what had been
a question of assuming objects becomes a question of verbal reference to
objects” (Quine 1981, 2, italics added).14
Quine’s criterion thus entails that the work of the ontologist is a relatively
formal, logical, and linguistic endeavor that is posterior to other scientific
inquiry. The ontologist goes to work only after the results of other sciences are
in; she uses first-order logic to regiment these results in order to display their
first-order quantificational structure, after which she can simply read off the
ontological commitments of the total theory.
Price’s second path from naturalism to ontological deflationism argues that
any non-deflationary, object naturalist interpretation of the kind of inquiry that
results from Quine’s criterion is not naturalistic by Quine’s own lights. Thus, he
claims that “Quine’s own position … is much closer to Carnap’s view than is
commonly assumed (2007, 378; see also Alspector-Kelly 2001).
In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950/1956), Carnap famously
claims that any ontological question is ambiguous between a reading that is
internal to a linguistic framework and a reading that is external to all frame-
works. Internal questions have straightforward answers determined by the
12 Note that Quine here provides a criterion for what a theory says there is, not a criterion for
what there actually is.
13 He also writes of which entities we “accept”, “acknowledge”, “admit”, “countenance”,
“hypostatize”, “posit”, “presuppose”, “reify”, or “reckon” (For this list and references see
Szabó (2003, 585)).
14 Quine famously argues for the “indeterminacy of reference” which, given his criterion of
ontological commitment, leads to indeterminacy in the ontological commitments of a theory.
Neo-Quinean analytic metaphysicians tend to reject Quine’s arguments for indeterminacy.
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evidential rules of the relevant framework. However, Carnap claims that any
external question “is of a problematic character” (Carnap 1950/1956, 206):
An alleged statement of the reality of the system of entities is a pseudo-statement without
cognitive content. To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is
a practical, not a theoretical question; it is question of whether or not to accept the new
linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is
not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive
to the aim for which the language is intended. (Carnap 1950/1956, 214)
This quotation suggests that deflationism about ontology follows directly from
the internal/external distinction. In explicating this idea, Price claims that
ontologists commit a use/mention fallacy (2009, 283). The only legitimate uses
of terms in ontological debates must be internal to a framework (since rough
conformity to the rules of a framework constitutes proper use). Legitimate
external questions must merely mention the terms in question; they are not
about numbers, say, but about how we should employ the term “number”.
What should we make of this argument? If we adopt a “thin” interpretation
of frameworks according to which they are merely languages or language-frag-
ments, then the conclusion is simply the trivial claim that one cannot ask
ontological questions or formulate ontological claims except in a language.15
Of course, this is true, but it is not something peculiar to metaphysics, as
opposed to any other area of inquiry. More importantly, it does not amount to
deflationism about ontology – it does not show that ontological questions are
misguided, trivial, or merely verbal or pragmatic disputes.
In short, as Price recognizes, on a thin interpretation of frameworks, this
argument simply begs the question against non-deflationary metaphysics by
assuming that ontologists must adopt a standpoint external to any linguistic
framework. Instead, they can follow Quine and simply claim that they (along
with every other inquirer) are working within a single “grand framework,” our
“web of belief,” and that this framework allows for questions to be asked about
the fundamental nature and structure of reality (Price 2009, 287). In other words,
the thin interpretation of frameworks is compatible with their being a unique
best linguistic framework in which to investigate what exists (cf. Eklund
2009, 137).
Note, though, that even this fairly trivial interpretation of the import of the
internal/external distinction – that there is no room for ontological investigation
15 For the distinction between thin and thick interpretations of frameworks see Eklund (2009,
132). I, in effect, turn to the question of whether the argument fairs better under a “thick”
interpretation of frameworks when I discuss Price’s “functional pluralism” below. See note 17.
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outside of our current best scientific theory of the world – is “deflationary” in
one good sense, what I’ll call minimal deflationism.
Minimal deflationism: Metaphysical inquiry should eschew both “first philosophy,” which
attempts to provide an independent ground for science, and “two-level” positions accord-
ing to which philosophy pursues distinctive goals via methods that are autonomous from
those of the sciences.16
Minimal deflationism, however, does not require, and should not be confused with,
ontological deflationism. For, as we’ll see in more detail below, it does not require
that naturalistic metaphysics must disappear as a distinct discipline, replaced by
the other sciences; it does not demand, as Price’s ontological deflationism does,
that we rest content with “the mundane business of existential quantification
carried out by first-order specialists in the course of their working lives.”
Up to this point, Carnap’s and Quine’s views on ontology are very similar. As
a result of a shared commitment to minimal deflationism, they both reject a priori
constraints on ontology, such as relying on certain intuitions about what does
and does not exist when interpreting scientific theories (e.g. the nominalist
intuitions that Quine himself once invoked in Quine and Goodman (1947)). On
Price’s view, however, Carnap’s and Quine’s paths now diverge temporarily over
the issue of whether descriptive language has a single function or multiple
functions – over whether functional monism or functional pluralism is true. But,
Price claims that, despite this divergence, Carnap and Quine both ultimately end
up in the same place, with a deflationary approach to ontology.
Price claims that Carnap is at least implicitly committed to the functional
pluralist view that I mentioned in the introduction (2009, 283; 2011a, 13). Using
functional pluralism, Price argues that Carnap can block Quine’s “single, grand
framework” response (outlined above) to the argument for ontological deflation-
ism that is based simply on the internal/external distinction (2009, 289ff.).17
Now, whether or not functional pluralism is true is ultimately an empirical
matter about which the jury is still out (1992, 45; 2009, 293–4). Thus, I obviously
cannot offer a knockdown argument against it here. But, even if functional
16 Minimal deflationism captures the naturalistic tenor of some of Carnap’s writings. See, e.g.
his (1934/1937, 332).
17 Price claims that the primary issue between functional monists and functional pluralists is
whether there is a coherent, framework-independent characterization of factual discourse (1992,
44–6). So, adopting functional pluralism pretty clearly amounts to invoking a “thick” inter-
pretation of linguistic frameworks, according to which truth and factuality are relative to a
framework and the question of whether a statement is true or factual, independently of any
framework, cannot even be raised. On the “thick” interpretation of frameworks, see Eklund
(2009, 132).
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pluralism is true in some form, it is far from clear whether this form will support
deflationary metaphysics. For instance, as Price himself points out, it is not clear
whether the empirical study of language will yield functional criteria that will
individuate frameworks in the way that the ontological deflationist requires
(1997, 147; 2009, 293).
Thus, the route to from naturalism to deflationary metaphysics via functional
pluralism is far from smooth, but I admit that, for all I’ve said in this paper, it
remains open. More importantly for current purposes, Price believes that any other
route that is open to naturalists also leads to ontological deflationism. In the next
two sub-sections, I argue that he is wrong about this. Non-deflationary naturalistic
metaphysics remains a viable option, but only if we recognize that there are
naturalistic reasons to depart significantly from “mainstream, Quinean” metaphy-
sics – by rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment.
Blocking the move from minimal deflationism to ontological
deflationism
The following passage nicely captures the two-stage nature of Quine’s approach
to ontology:
Instead of asking, first, what there really is or could really be, and then shaping scientific
doctrine in order to conform to that determination, we first ask what the best scientific
doctrine is to date, and then determine what that doctrine says there is by asking what
entities must exist for it to be true. The first move is naturalism. Scientific inquiry being the
best, and indeed the only, epistemological game in town, we can do no better than endorse
its results with no more reservation than scientific fallibility in general allows. The second
move is the application of his criterion of ontological commitment. (Alspector-Kelly 2001, 114)
Now, Price distinguishes between two ways of interpreting Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment. On the first, “thin” reading, Quine’s principle is simply
an affirmation of ontological deflationism – simply acquiescence in what “first-
order specialists” – tell us there is (1992, 50). On the second, “thick” reading, the
activities of first-order specialists is taken to be “raw data” for the second-order
science of ontology: the fact that specialists quantify over entities of a certain
kind is taken to be evidence that these entities actually exist (1992, 50). In a more
recent paper, Price admits that these readings are caricatures, and he explores
three strategies for “beefing up” the thin version into something with a more
active, and realistic, role for philosophy: ontologists could focus on truthmakers,
the interpretation of scientific theories, or the quantificational structure of the-
ories (2007, 384). But, Price points out, it is naturalistically unacceptable for any
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of these strategies to involve a two-stage process in which one first does the
science and then steps outside science to figure out how things really are. Thus,
Price claims, “only the thin reading can really be regarded as legitimate by
Quine’s own lights” (2007, 382).
Take a particular example. Assuming that number theory is part of our
current best total science, we can run the following “cheap argument”:
There is an even prime.
Primes are numbers.
Therefore, numbers exist.18
As Zoltan Gendler Szabó has pointed out (2003, 590), if ontological debates are
debates about what we should quantify over, then there are only three responses
one can have to such an argument: (1) Accept the argument as sound, and take
the relevant ontological question to be settled. (2) Reject one of the premises. (3)
Claim that the argument equivocates and that it is invalid (or if it is valid and
settles the ontological question, it does so only on a disambiguation that
requires additional argument for at least one of the premises).
Most nominalists (and Platonists who engage in debate with them) take the
third option.19 Mainstream analytic metaphysicians also typically take this option
when they want to deny ontological commitment to some kind of entity or other.
Roughly, such philosophers claim that the first premise and conclusion are clearly
true in an ontologically innocent “loose and popular” sense of “exist” or “there
are”. However, this sense is not what is at issue in ontological debates. When we
do ontology we care about the “strict and philosophical” sense of ‘exist’ or ‘there
are,’ and taken in this sense, the first premise (and conclusion) is either false or is
not something that is settled by number theory (or science in general) alone (cf.
Sider’s discussion of introducing the language Ontologese for use in the meta-
physics room (2011, 171ff.)). The third option thus amounts to one of Price’s
“thick” readings of Quinean meta-ontology, all of which take the conclusion of
cheap arguments to be merely data that do not settle ontological questions. I think
that Price is right to reject these views as in tension with naturalism.
18 Cheap arguments can be given for the existence of other entities about which there is debate
in analytic metaphysics: e.g. ordinary, macroscopic objects, like tables (from premises sup-
ported not only by “common sense” but also by solid-state physics), mental states (from
premises supported by cognitive psychology), or events (from premises supported by
linguistics).
19 As Alspector-Kelly writes, empiricist/nominalist critics of Carnap know that “… when one is
engaged in mathematics, denial of ‘There is an even prime’ evinces mathematical incompetence
rather than ontological restraint. But that, of course, is not taken to decide the ontological issue,
which concerns the fidelity of quantification over numbers to reality” (2001, 105).
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Further, the second option is unattractive, since as Szabó notes, it threatens
to make ontological inquiry “futile” (2003, 591). If we deny such obvious claims
as the premises of cheap arguments, we run the risk of losing track of what we
arguing about and of merely talking past our opponents. So, naturalists seem to
be stuck with the first option, which amounts to ontological deflationism. For, as
Szabó notes, the first option makes ontological inquiry “vacuous,” (2003, 591):
“if ontological debates can be so readily resolved, then they seem to be unsui-
table for serious philosophical inquiry” (2003, 589).
Szabó takes this to be a cost, but ontological deflationists think it is a virtue.
Szabó complains that: “It is not irrational to take a skeptical or outright elim-
inativist stance towards [numbers], even if it is in the end incorrect to do so”
(2003, 589). Ontological deflationists would reply that questions of (framework-
independent) rationality or correctness do not even arise; to think otherwise is to
take factual, external ontological questions to be legitimate. On their view, such
questions are not suitable for serious philosophical inquiry; they are pragmatic
matters of choosing a linguistic framework.
So, minimal deflationism seems to leave us with the “thin” reading of
Quinean meta-ontology and thus with ontological deflationism (Price 2007,
389). Note, however, that taking the first option with respect to “cheap argu-
ments” has two parts: (i) accepting these arguments as sound (i.e. the first,
naturalistic move in the block quotation from Alspector-Kelly above, which is
required by what I’ve called minimal deflationism) and (ii) taking such argu-
ments to settle ontological disputes (i.e. the second move in the passage from
Alspector-Kelly – Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment). It is only these
two parts together that take us all the way to ontological deflationism. Similarly,
Price’s claim that the “thin” and three “thick” readings of Quine’s doctrine of
ontological commitment exhaust the options available to the naturalistic meta-
physician presupposes that Quine’s doctrine of ontological commitment is true.
Thus, if we reject Quine’s doctrine of ontological commitment, i.e. if we
deny that believing that there are Xs (i.e. quantifying over Xs) amounts to full-
blown ontological commitment to Xs, then another option opens up: we can
accept cheap arguments as sound, without taking the relevant ontological
questions to be thereby settled (cf. Szabó 2003, 591). This makes room for a
non-deflationary conception of naturalistic metaphysics – a way of defending
object naturalism – that avoids Price’s false dilemma between a “thin” meta-
physics that merely acquiesces in the ontological verdicts of the other sciences
and a “thick” metaphysics that uses only logical methods of regimentation and
supposedly stands outside of science altogether. Instead, as I outline in the final
main section, “A sketch of non-deflationary naturalistic metaphysics”, it is a
truly multi-disciplinary endeavor, drawing on and synthesizing the results of
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many disciplines, including the history and philosophy of science, using the
skills which philosophical training provides.
Naturalistic reasons to reject Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment
We’ve seen that naturalists have two pragmatic reasons to reject Quine’s criter-
ion: first, to avoid a linguistic approach to metaphysics that must face the
challenges to Representationalism if it is to be non-deflationary; second, to
avoid the charge that the only options for a non-deflationary metaphysics are
not naturalistically acceptable. There are at least two lines of thought that also
provide naturalists with good evidential reasons to reject Quine’s criterion.
First, Quine’s criterion implies that any remaining difference between the
question of “assuming objects” (or “believing in objects”) and the question of
“verbal reference to objects” (or “quantifying over objects”) is insignificant for the
purposes of ontological debates (cf. Szabó 2003, 585). Naturalists should be
suspicious of this claim given that it is, at least in part, motivated by Quine’s
behaviorism and the accompanying abhorrence of intentional mental states, both
of which are now widely (and rightly in my view) regarded as scientifically
suspect. Absent these motivations, I can see no good reason to think that the
difference between these questions can be safely ignored. For one thing, all of the
evidence that supports semantic externalism suggests that it is fairly easy to refer
to things in the world (e.g. via deference to experts), but it is far from clear if
ontological commitments can be accrued so easily. In fact, Szabó (2003, 2010) has
given strong arguments for the idea that we cannot safely ignore the difference
between believing in (or being ontologically committed to) things and referring to
(or quantifying over) them – that it is not enough to quantify over a purported
entity in order to assert an ontological commitment to it.20
20 Szabó’s (2003) begins with a quotation from a book on mythological creatures that suggests
that some scientists rationally believed that the term “sea serpent” refers to something in the
oceans while withholding ontological commitment to sea serpents. In the 2010 paper, Szabó
claims that he stands by his conclusions in his (2003) but now provides a different argument for
them because he has “grown dissatisfied that they [were] so tightly connected to semantic
considerations” (2010, 39 n. 13). Szabó does not elaborate on the reasons for this dissatisfaction;
my discussion above shows that it is justified if one wants to remain a naturalist while avoiding
ontological deflationism. Roughly, on Szabó’s view, ontological commitment to Xs requires
believing that Xs exist and being able to explain why Xs exist, which requires knowing what the
nature of Xs is.
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, as Penelope Maddy has argued,
Quine’s criterion does not adequately portray how rational debates about ontol-
ogy have actually been conducted in the sciences (e.g. 1997, 135–43; 2007, 95–7,
398–407). She claims that both (a) work on atomic theory at the turn of the
twentieth century and (b) the nature of idealization and mathematization in
science suggests that: “Pace Quine, determining what our successful theories
tell us about what there is cannot be a simple matter of reading off their
existential claims” (2007, 107).21 Rather, “a consistent naturalist must recognize
various different types of evidence and various different roles hypotheses can
play in our theorizing” when she is engaged in ontological debates (2007, 96;
see also 316–17).
Maddy frames her critique of Quine as aimed primarily at his confirmational
holism (e.g. 2007, 95). However, she apparently does not see much, if any,
substantive difference between her way of putting things and one that takes
aim directly at Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment (1997, 143; 2007, 95
n. 20).22 I suggest that Maddy’s argument is best interpreted as motivating a
position similar to Szabó’s, according to which scientists in 1900 were right to
believe that there are atoms but also correct to withhold ontological commit-
ment to atoms (in this case because detection of atoms (a new type of evidence
altogether) awaited the work of Jean Perrin). But whether we deny that entire
theories are confirmed as a unit or deny that we are committed to everything
that our theories quantify over, the important point for my purposes is that
either critique undermines the idea that we can simply read ontological commit-
ments off of what a theory says there is.
A sketch of non-deflationary naturalistic
metaphysics
So far I’ve said very little about what an alternative, non-deflationary naturalis-
tic metaphysics would look like. Fully developing this alternative approach is a
project for another occasion, but in conclusion I want to sketch some of its
features by drawing on the lessons learned from my critique of Price.
21 van Fraassen (2009) has recently argued that Jean Perrin’s work on Brownian motion, which
Maddy crucially relies on, does not support naturalistic realism about atoms of the kind Maddy
(and I) endorse. Chalmers (2011) responds to van Fraassen.
22 Maddy (1996, 333; 1997, 143) also suggests that her critique might be taken to be aimed at
the univocality of either “there is” or the existential quantifier (both of which are fundamental
tenets of Quinean meta-ontology (van Inwagen 2009)).
Must Naturalism Lead to a Deflationary Meta-Ontology? 363
Those who approach metaphysics from a naturalistic yet non-deflationary
perspective must endorse minimal deflationism, which I suggest is a core ele-
ment of any naturalistic position. As we’ve seen above, they also should
approach metaphysical questions from the material conception. I think that the
best way of satisfying these constraints is to think of naturalistic metaphysics as
itself a “first-order” science alongside the other sciences. This implies that if we
accept the slogan that “science tells us what to believe in,” we are not asserting
what this slogan is often taken to mean. In particular, we are not claiming that
physics, psychology, chemistry, biology, etc., taken on their own, individually or
collectively, tell us what to believe in. Rather, the science of naturalistic meta-
physics typically tells us what to believe in.
It is not that naturalistic metaphysicians have some exclusive ownership of
ontological questions, nor do they have some special methods of determining
what we do, or should, believe in. Rather, they synthesize and reflect upon (and
in some cases, correct23) the methods and results from a wide variety of scientific
disciplines, using the skills that training in (naturalistic) philosophy is particu-
larly well suited to provide.24 In straightforward cases, the work they do could
be done by many scientifically literate people (see, e.g. Maddy on the existence
of “medium-sized physical objects” (2007, 403–4)). But in difficult cases, they
simply apply these same reliable scientific methods in ways in which other
scientists typically do not and typically don’t have the training for (cf. Maddy
2007, 115, 407). For instance, giving a detailed account of why some scientists
believed in atoms in 1910, but not in 1900, and why they were correct to do so,
will involve synthesizing and critically reflecting on results from (at least)
physics, chemistry, applied mathematics, and perceptual psychology. And,
examining whether we should be ontologically committed to intentional states
or conscious states will involve synthesis of, and reflection on, work from (at
least!) biochemistry, neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, psychophysics, cog-
nitive neuroscience, cognitive and social psychology, linguistics, and sociology.
In any case, from the approach of the material conception, Price is certainly
wrong to think that we can stop with a linguistic investigation of the way we talk
about atoms, beliefs, or conscious states.
If the work I drew on in the previous subsection (“Naturalistic reasons
to reject Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment”) is on the right track,
then our inquirers also need to reject the Quinean criterion of ontological
23 Maddy mentions feminist critiques of primatology in this regard (2007, 407).
24 Note that naturalists will claim that the interpretation of scientific theories is part of science
itself and does not require a kind of reasoning that is completely independent of the way we
have discovered the world to be.
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commitment in order to fully realize the goal of naturalizing non-deflation-
ary metaphysics. Rejecting Quine’s criterion also allows us to offer oblique
answers to some ontological questions – by allowing that the entities in
question exist (quantifying over them) while denying ontological commit-
ment to them (cf. Szabó 2003, 607–9; 2010, 36–8). For instance, this kind of
view might be currently motivated by our best current theories of conscious
states. The fact that there are many obvious true claims about such states
entails that there are conscious states. But, on this view, this is compatible
with either (1) our current best account of consciousness being mistaken
about its nature or (2) currently being unable to detect conscious states in
an appropriate way (cf. Schwitzgebel 2011), either of which, on different
versions of such a view, would warrant withholding ontological commit-
ment to conscious states.
It is possible that this kind of oblique answer is the best that we can ever
give to some ontological questions. For example, it might be the best that we can
say about beliefs if folk psychology is radically mistaken, for in that case there
might be no fact of the matter about what beliefs really are.25 In any case, I think
that the fact that this kind of oblique response is available to non-deflationary
naturalistic ontologists allows them to capture the kernel of truth in full-blown
ontological deflationism. It allows one to accept the “cheap arguments” that
ontological deflationists are so fond of without claiming that there is nothing left
for metaphysicians to do.
I have argued that Price is wrong to think that naturalists must adopt a
deflationary, linguistic approach to ontology. However, grappling with his rich
and provocative work has shown that naturalists who wish to pursue a more
substantive approach to metaphysics cannot simply rest content with main-
stream, “Quinean” metaphysics. What’s more, I’ve suggested that departing
from the mainstream, by rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment,
enables such naturalists to capture whatever salutary motivations lie behind
Price’s own deflationary approach to ontology.
Acknowledgment: I presented an earlier version of some of this material at the
Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science Conference in Toronto (May 2011) and
the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting in Seattle (April
2012). Thanks to the audiences on those occasions, and to my commentator at
the latter, Troy Cross, for helpful comments and discussion.
25 Devitt also suggests that some ontological questions may not have determinate answers and
uses the existence of intentional states as an example (2009, 319–20).
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